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LEA B. VAUGHN*
A Need for Clarity: Toward A New
Standard for Preliminary Injunctions
T HE traditional standard for issuing a preliminary injunction'
considers four factors:
1. plaintiff's probability of success on the merits,
2. irreparable injury to the plaintiff if the injunction is not
granted before trial,
3. the balance of harms, a comparison of the plaintiff's harm
and the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted
and the defendant prevails, and
4. the public interest, where appropriate.2
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derful course on injunctions and first interested me in this subject. Ed Cooper, Patrick
Dobel, Joan Hollinger, Doug Laycock, Wallace Lob, Fred Schauer, and Phil Trautman
read earlier drafts of this Article, as did my colleagues in the Puget Sound Women Law
Faculty Group. I thank them for their patient support and criticism, although any
errors remain my own. The Washington Law Foundation provided financial support
for this project. Catherine Burke and Audrey Johnson-Taylor repeatedly typed manu-
scripts. Finally, I thank Patrick, Hilary, and Matthew Dobel for their love and
patience.
I This discussion is limited to preliminary injunctions and will not cover temporary
restraining orders (TROs). Although they are similar in many respects, preliminary
injunctions always require notice to the adverse party. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a). The
TRO does not. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); see 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & K. SINCLAIR, JR.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.05 (1987) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE]; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947, at
426 (1973) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
2 This is a distillation of formulas appearing in the cases, casebooks, and secondary
literature. See, e.g., 0. FIss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 343-44 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter FISS & RENDLEMAN]; D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 398, 401 n.3
(1985) (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League,
634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980)). Some authorities vary this formula by combining fac-
tors two and three into a single step. This single step requires the court to balance the
irreparable harms that might occur to either the plaintiff or the defendant before trial.
The plaintiff's harm must be more serious if plaintiff is to prevail. In that form, the step
is called "balancing the harms." It is distinguishable from "undue hardship," which is
an equitable defense. Whatever the formula, the burden of persuasion rests with the
plaintiff. Throughout this Article, the party seeking the injunction will be referred to as
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To use this extraordinary remedy, plaintiffs have had to carry the
heavy burden of proving all four factors, including a strong likeli-
hood of prevailing on the merits. In this form, the standard is
called the traditional or sequential test.'
Over time, the courts have developed variations of the traditional
test. Some courts balance the four factors against one another, with
success on the merits no longer a threshold test. This standard is
called a balancing test. A few courts apply the "alternatives" test.
Under this test, the plaintiff has the option of showing "either (1)
probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly
toward the party requesting preliminary relief."5
The choice of a standard can affect the outcome of a case. For
example, under a balancing test, proof of uncertain success on the
merits could be balanced against a showing of great irreparable in-
jury, and the plaintiff might be able to obtain an injunction. But
under the traditional sequential test, the court could not engage in
these trade-offs among different factors, and the plaintiff would not
obtain an injunction for failure to prove a high likelihood of success
on the merits. Generally, the application of the balancing test is
characterized as more relaxed, or liberal, than the sequential test.
In contrast, the alternatives test is criticized as overly liberal. Thus,
problems arise from the inability to predict when or why a court
will use any one of these three tests. All commentators agree that
the coexistence of these standards in the federal courts has led to
confusion.6
"plaintiff," and the party resisting the application will be called "defendant." Also, the
terms "standard" and "test" will be used interchangeably.
3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 65.04[l]. Although all three tests
could be found in the collected cases of any one circuit, the sequential test is associated
with the First, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Id.
4 Moore's Federal Practice associates this test with the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuit. Id. The balancing test can and does take a wide variety of forms.
5 Sonesta Int'l Hotels v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973).
Moore's Federal Practice associates this test with the Second and Ninth Circuits.
Although it states that the Ninth Circuit uses the alternatives test, as the analysis below
will demonstrate, this characterization is incorrect. This mistake is not surprising, how-
ever, because even the commentators cannot agree on which circuit is using which test.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1.
6 See Black, A New Look at Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles From the Past
Offer any Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1984);
Castles, Interlocutory Injunctions in Flux. A Plea for Uniformity, 34 Bus. LAW. 1359
(1979); McLaughlin & Tallon, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in the Federal Courts, in I
CIV. PRAC. & LITIGATION IN FED. & ST. CTS. 877 (1987); Wolf, Preliminary Injunc-
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This lack of uniformity has caused havoc in litigation, and the
courts have consistently failed to confront it." They have been un-
willing to articulate a jurisprudence describing the appropriate stan-
dards for the issuance of preliminary injunctions.' The confusion
has two sources. First, and most obviously, the courts have dis-
agreed on the relationship between the four factors. Should these
factors, for example, be proven sequentially or balanced against one
another? The more subversive, but less apparent, problem is the
definition of the factors themselves. Generally, they still carry the
freight of historical equity. The courts have not asked whether
these terms reflect their actual use and meaning in modem litiga-
tion. For example, what does "irreparable injury" mean, and what
is its relationship to inadequate legal remedies?9 A close examina-
tion of the traditional factors reveals that they do not meet the
needs of contemporary adjudication. °
This Article examines the various standards for preliminary in-
junctions and demonstrates the ways in which the standards have
become confused by irrelevant layers of meaning. Those layers of
meaning are analyzed; nonfunctional accretions are discarded, and
legitimate modem meanings are developed. The discussion is con-
ducted against a background of assumptions about what makes a
good standard, for example, accessibility and comprehensiveness.
By modernizing the standard, the parties and the courts will frankly
and openly discuss the underlying legal issues and values. This, in
turn, should lead to more legitimate decisions."
tions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173 (1984). Moreover, the
commentators do not always agree among themselves. For example, Black, supra, at 3,
recognizes three dominant standards, while Wolf, supra, at 183, identifies nine.
7 One circuit has articulated a single standard. See Dataphase Sys. v. C.L. System,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also infra notes 146-52 and accompany-
ing text.
8 See Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525
(1978).
9 The well-documented growth of the federal caseload makes thoughtful reflection
and consistency difficult. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 59-93 (1985). Judge Posner notes that between 1960 and 1983 there was a
250% increase in district court filings. Id. at 63-64. At the same time, there has been a
tremendous growth of new legal rights, many of which are addressed by injunctions.
See generally 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
10 Professor Rendleman, for example, points out that the term "inadequacy" has de-
veloped several different meanings over time. Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at
Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346 (1981).
1 IMany commentators note that the existing confusion provides an opportunity for
courts to engage in unprincipled or result-oriented choices between the standards. See,
e.g., Hammond, Interlocutory Injunctions.: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO
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Under a modernized standard, a court should redress immediate
pretrial harm and preserve the litigation in a way that renders sub-
sequent decisions meaningful. Further, a court's ability to act will
not be limitless;12 instead, by clarifying the terms' meanings, a
court's discretion will be bounded by the attributes of the standard
itself as well as by preexisting external constraints. The analysis
ends with a normative description of the relationship between the
factors and concludes that a balancing test is the best form for such
a relationship.
THE QUALITIES OF A GOOD STANDARD
Before urging a particular standard, a prior concern sets the stage
for discussion: What qualities should the appropriate standard pos-
sess? A workable standard should embody at least four features.
First, it should encourage purposeful argument and deliberation by
the court and the parties. By focusing their attention on only factu-
ally and legally relevant matters, it will allow informed and produc-
tive discussions of the case. Second, the standard should attempt to
equalize power between the parties, allowing them to present their
best case. Third, the standard should promote clarity and candor,
both in arguments and decisions. Finally, it should be easy to use.
All of these characteristics tend to interlock; the presence of one
is supportive of the others. The end result is improved decision-
making that addresses all issues and leaves the parties believing they
have been treated fairly. But because of the differing standards, liti-
gation has become a shell game. Rather than focusing on the merits
of their case, parties try to read the judge's mind and sift through
the tea leaves of precedent. Litigators choose one standard and
hope that by persuading the court to adopt their version, a victori-
ous result will follow. A good standard, however, should focus ar-
L.J. 240 (1980). A similar concern animates Judge Posner's development of a standard
in the Seventh Circuit.
12 This Article focuses on standards for issuing a preliminary injunction, and it does
not consider the statutory injunction. With the rise of federal legislation since the New
Deal, an increasing number of statutes provide for permanent injunctive relief. Many of
these statutes specify situations in which equitable relief is appropriate or the conditions
under which it may be granted. Such laws should be familiar to attorneys practicing
antitrust, environmental, and labor law. The ways in which these statutes and equity
interact will not be a focus of this Article. Such specialized injunctions have been the
subject of a vast amount of literature. See, e.g., 0. Fiss, supra note 9; F. FRANKFURTER
& N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); Plater, Statutory Violations and Equi-
table Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524 (1982).
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gument on the facts and law of the case rather than on the choice of
a particular standard or the meaning of terms within it. Currently,
the latter state of affairs controls litigation.
A proper standard will encourage purposeful deliberation. It will
enable the parties to focus on the relevant issues, marshal the
known facts, and intelligently discuss them. For example, because
of the numerous tests and the surrounding uncertainty as to their
meaning, arguments about which test to use become a threshold the
parties must cross before they can reach the merits of their case.
An efficient standard will generally allow parties to skip this step,
eliminating argument about the meaning of its components. This is
particularly important in the preliminary injunction setting where
time is precious, and the facts and law are not completely known.
In short, a standard should generate the maximum amount of rele-
vant information possible and focus the attention of the court and
the parties.
Closely related to the concept of purposeful discussion, although
distinct from it, is the concept that the equitable standard, imbued
with common, shared meaning, attempts to equalize access to jus-
tice. When all of the terms of the standard have accessible and
agreed upon meanings, the parties can stand as semantic equals.
No special knowledge or rhetoric should be needed. In this way, no
party should have an advantage over the other. 3 Thus, parties will
feel they are being treated fairly. In a sense, this requirement im-
ports due process notions into the standard.
The standard ought to foster clarity and candor. This is not now
the case. For example, a court may conclusorily deny a preliminary
injunction for failure to show "irreparable injury." Given the host
of meanings for this term, it may be unclear to the parties what the
court means. Further, the parties may not understand the actual
grounds for decision. Similarly, in some cases the rationale is bur-
ied under the outmoded maxims of equity. A good standard should
not leave parties dissatisfied in this fashion. By promoting clarity in
the context of purposeful deliberation, the actual grounds of deci-
sion will be apparent and openly discussed.
Finally, the standard should be as simple as possible. Neither a
judge nor a party should need special competence or privileged
knowledge to use it. The standard should be understandable to the
13 It would be naive to believe that the parties approach the bench with equal mone-
tary resources or with equal levels of legal skill. A proper standard, however, should
attempt to compensate for these external differences.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
general legal community. And it should be neither over nor under-
inclusive of the relevant factors and their relationship to one
another. 
14
All of these qualities contribute to improved decisionmaking.
But a good standard would have other salutary consequences as
well. For example, in addition to focusing the parties' arguments
when requesting relief, it should also help the parties determine
whether they should even seek relief. Thus, it should reduce both
specious arguments and frivolous litigation. Reduction of these two
inefficiencies would be one small step in reducing the case backlog
and improving access to, and administration of, justice.
II
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have not
squarely addressed the issue of an appropriate standard for issuing a
preliminary injunction.15 When the Supreme Court has commented
on preliminary injunctions, it has been in passing or subsidiary to
the major issue in the case. While the Court's decisions have gener-
ated certain minima to which the lower courts should have adhered,
they have left more questions asked than answered.' 6
The Supreme Court cases do firmly preserve the trial court's dis-
cretion; injunctions are not issued automatically or as of right.
Even in the face of statutes which appear to alter the trial court's
decisionmaking powers, the Court has repeatedly endorsed tradi-
tional equitable discretion.17 Thus, lower courts retain the flexibil-
ity to mold the decree to the circumstances of the case. The Court
implicitly recognizes that no statute or rule can predict the uncer-
14 Such a standard will not reveal the judge's inner thought process; rather, it will
respond to the focused arguments of the parties.
15 Several commentators have noted the Supreme Court's reluctance to do so. See,
e.g., Wolf, supra note 6, at 174.
16 Although there are many early cases which remark on the preliminary injunction,
this discussion will focus on contemporary cases. These are the cases to which the
lower courts are most likely to look. For a fuller discussion of early Supreme Court
cases, see id. at 174-81.
17 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (statute did not withdraw
court's equitable discretion); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) ("The
award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity has never been regarded as
strictly a matter of right .... "); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944) (court
had discretion to refuse injunction even where statute said an injunction "shall be
granted" for proven violations). The Romero decision is criticized in Plater, supra note
12.
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tainties of any given situation.'
While the Court has consistently preserved equitable discretion,
the Justices have not been of one mind in developing standards for
issuing preliminary injunctions. Yet, the Supreme Court could
clear away much of the doctrinal thicket. For example, what fac-
tors should a court consider when issuing a preliminary injunction?
How much shall each factor be weighted? A standard which re-
quires probable success on the merits may doom the plaintiff's ap-
plication, while requiring only that the plaintiff raise a serious
question may keep the case alive. Once the Court answers these
questions, it still must face the relationship between these factors.
Must a litigant make a showing on every factor, or can a weak
showing on merits be balanced by a stronger showing of harm? The
definition, weighting, and relationship of the factors is central to
evaluating a case.
Trying to determine to what extent one must prove irreparable
injury or success on the merits from a reading of Supreme Court
cases is frustrating. For example, the Court, in Ohio Oil v. Con-
way, 9 describes success on the merits as a "grave" question, and
states that injury must be "certain." ' 20 But in Mayo v. Lakeland
Highlands Canning,2' the Court says the merits must raise "serious
questions."22 Another case, Brown v. Chote,23 refers to the "pos-
sibilities of success on the merits" and the "possibility that irrepara-
ble injury would have resulted."124  One year later, rather than
dealing with "possibilities," the Court measures "likelihoods" of ir-
reparable injury and success on the merits.25 Yet another formula-
tion appears where the Court states that the plaintiff must show
that "he will suffer irreparable injury" and that he is "likely to pre-
18 FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a) addresses only procedural issues and does not announce a
standard for issuing preliminary injunctions. The rule states simply that "[n]o prelimi-
nary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party." FED. R. Civ. P.
65(a)(1). Although the rule is a direct outgrowth of equity practice in the United States,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note I, at 65.02, the drafters of the rule intention-
ally avoided addressing the standard for issuing preliminary injunctions. See Dobie,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 301 (1939). Given this
history, the rule gives little help in determining an appropriate standard for preliminary
injunctions.
19 279 U.S. 813 (1929).20 1d. at 815.
21 309 U.S. 310 (1940).
22 Id. at 316.
23411 U.S. 452 (1973).
24 Id. at 456.
25 Granny Goose Foods v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974).
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vail on the merits." 26
In addition, the Court does not determine to what extent irrepa-
rable injury and the merits can be traded off against one another.
For example, in Ohio Oil v. Conway,2 7 the Court balanced the fac-
tors of irreparable injury and success on the merits. This balancing
approach was also followed in Yakus v. United States,28 where the
Court spoke of balancing "the conveniences of the parties and
[their] possible injuries. ' 29 In Brown, the Court noted with ap-
proval the way in which the district court had balanced success on
the merits and irreparable injury.3" But in the later case of Doran v.
Salem Inn,3 the Court in dicta described a situation in which the
plaintiff was required to show both irreparable injury and success
on the merits.32
The casual reader of these cases may brush off these observations
as mere semantic quibbles, but an informed reader of the Supreme
Court opinions cannot derive a rule or standard from these deci-
sions. Thus, the lower courts are free to employ a dizzying array of
standards. These diverse formulas are also disturbing because of
the off-hand way-generally in dicta-that they are issued by the
Court. The Court has failed to address a basic issue which pervades
and affects a sweeping variety of statutory and common law. 33
The Court has spoken with more authority and certainty on a
third prerequisite: public interest. This factor allows courts to con-
sider the interests of nonparties to litigation by assessing the effect a
grant or denial of an injunction would have on their position. The
Court first discussed this issue in Virginian Railway v. System Fed-
26 Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
27 279 U.S. 813 (1929).
28 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
2 9 
Id. at 440.
30411 U.S. 452, 456 (1973).
31 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
32 Id. at 931-32. When the Court sets forth the standard for irreparable injury, it
appears to be a balancing test, but when it is applied to success on the merits, it appears
to be a traditional sequential test. The Doran opinion is frustrating because it does not
refer to the prior cases nor does it attempt to reconcile its earlier language about
balancing.
33 Although there has not been much scholarly comment on the standard for prelimi-
nary injunctions, and the writers themselves disagree on what the standard should be,
all of them agree that the time has come for a uniform standard and that the Supreme
Court should address this question. See Black, supra note 6; Leubsdorf, supra note 8;
Wolf, supra note 6.
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eration No. 40,34 where it considered the appropriateness of a per-
manent injunction ordering the employer in a labor dispute to
negotiate. The Court said: "Courts of equity may, and frequently
do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance
of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only
private interests are involved." 35 Given the public interest in tran-
quil labor relations, the Court concluded that the grant of a perma-
nent injunction was authorized by statute and was an appropriate
exercise of the court's power. 36
Yakus v. United States37 represents the Court's first definitive
pronouncement on the role public interest should play in issuing
preliminary injunctions.3" Ordinarily, the trial court will require
the plaintiff to post a bond that will adequately protect the defend-
ant's interests if the injunction has been improvidently entered. But
a bond cannot compensate the public interest. In these cases, "the
court may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determi-
nation of the rights of the parties, though the postponement may be
burdensome to the plaintiff."39 This description is noteworthy be-
cause it suggests that in some cases the public interest can trump
the moving party's showing of harm.
The public interest factor retains its vitality in modem cases. For
example, in Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Wichita Board
of Trade,' the Court considered a preliminary injunction entered to
suspend Interstate Commerce Commission regulations relating to
the inspection of goods in transit on the railroads. Here, however,
the Court acknowledged that "public interest is not a simple fact,
easily determined by courts."'" In this particular case, the Court
listed the different public interest groups that must be considered:
farmers and consumers, producers, and consumers who ship other
goods on the railways. Where there are conflicting public interests,
34 300 U.S. 515 (1937). This case is better known for upholding the Railway Labor
Act.
35 Id. at 552. American courts have been far more receptive to public interest consid-
erations than British courts. Hammond, supra note 11, at 248.
36 Virginian R.R., 300 U.S. at 562-63; see also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321
(1944); Inland Steel v. United States, 306 U.S. 153 (1939).
37 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
38 The acknowledgement that public interest would play a role in the grant of prelim-
inary injunctions first comes in Inland Steel, but it is as an aside and not fully
considered.
39 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440.
40412 U.S. 800 (1973).
41 Id. at 824.
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the lower court must balance their competing claims.42
More recent decisions continue to maintain that in appropriate
cases the public interest is a relevant factor.4" But maintaining that
the public interest may be considered is not the same thing as ex-
plaining how it may be considered. In the midst of existing fact
uncertainty, an unbounded consideration of public interest threat-
ens to overwhelm the process. For example, the Court does not
define admissible evidence of public interest or who may introduce
that evidence. Even if these sources are identified, Atchison raises
the specter of multiple public interests within one case. The Court
does not suggest how these might be balanced or weighted against
one another. Finally, the Court poses guidelines for situations in
which the public interest can lead to a denial of a preliminary in-
junction for an otherwise deserving plaintiff.
In summary, the Court has not been a great help in the search for
an optimal standard. Generally, the lower courts and litigants are
left to sift through "federal equity practice." If there is anything
one can discern from the Supreme Court cases, it seems to be that
the lower courts should consider some notion of irreparable harm,
success on the merits, and when appropriate, the public interest.
But none of these terms are defined nor are we given a consistent
weighting or relationship between these factors.
III
THE COMPONENTS OF THE REDEFINED STANDARD
Any discussion of the preliminary injunction, then, boils down to
first principles: the doctrines of equity." In this Part, the tradi-
tional components of the preliminary injunction standard-the pur-
42 Id. at 824-26.
43 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1982) (upholding Yakus,
court need not award injunction for every violation of law); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper,
422 U.S. 49, 64-65 (1975) (public interest does not relieve corporation from proving
irreparable injury in SEC case). Professor Plater argues that Weinberger was incor-
rectly decided and that a court using equitable discretion should not be able to override
Congress' statutory intent. Plater, supra note 12. But cf. Schoenbrod, The Measure of
an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy,
72 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1988) (disagreeing with Plater and proposing a new test).
44 The interested reader is referred to 0. Fiss, supra note 9; G. McDOWELL, EQUITY
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1982); Hammond, supra note 11; Leubsdorf, supra note 8. Readers wishing to
go back even further should see Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700,
61 IND. L.J. 539 (1986).
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poses, the merits, irreparable injury, the balance of harms, and the
public interest-are evaluated and, when necessary, redefined.
A. Purposes
Statements about the purpose of a preliminary injunction almost
always accompany a court's recitation of a standard. Often boiler-
plate, these invocations nonetheless provide a rationale that shapes
a particular standard and cannot be divorced from it. For example,
in close cases, reference to the purpose of the injunction may serve
as a tie breaker.45 Three candidates for the purpose present them-
selves: maintaining the status quo, preserving the court's ability to
render a meaningful decision, and minimizing the risk of error. All
of these purposes may act, like the standard itself, as a gatekeeper.
Moreover, these purposes are not necessarily contradictory; they
may overlap.
Historically, preserving the status quo stands out as the most
common justification. Consider the following common statement:
"The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo between the parties pending a final determination of the merits
of the action."46 Maintaining the status quo incorporates several
considerations for granting interlocutory relief. Within the context
of historical equity, it theoretically afforded the moving party effec-
tive relief after a full trial on the merits.47 The term was often used
reflexively and in combination with other equitable principles.48
Courts did not always fully consider what leaving the parties in the
status quo, however defined, might do to their relative positions.
For example, blindly invoking the status quo in a situation in which
the defendant has already caused some harm to the moving party is
not effective relief.
45 Imagine a case before two different judges. Each judge gives identical weight and
definition to the four factors, but Judge A applies the status quo (as in the last peaceable,
non-contested status), while Judge B feels the purpose is to minimize the risk of error.
Assuming defendant is engaged in peaceable but arguably harmful conduct, Judge A
could.allow this to continue, while Judge B, if defendant's case on the merits is weak,
may forbid the conduct.
46 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 65.04[1]; see also Leubsdorf, supra
note 8, at 534-35; Wolf, supra note 6, at 173-74.
47 The concept of the status quo has been roundly criticized in the literature. Almost
all commentators reject it as a useful principle.
48 Black, supra note 6, points out how invocation of the status quo was often accom-
panied by the observation that equity cannot command an affirmative act. She argues
that the mandatory/permissive distinction is no longer useful, although the concerns
that animated it may be worth considering.
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The status quo concept also embraces a timing factor. At some
point in the relationship or transactions between the parties the
court must identify it. Classically, that time was the last peaceable
status between the parties.49 But when courts attempted to inquire
into that peaceable situation, they have tripped over another com-
ponent of a status quo oriented purpose: the parties' subjective de-
scription of that time. One person's last noncontested status was
often another's declaration of war.
When these components are added together, it becomes easy to
see why the status quo purpose has been so freely abandoned. The
doctrine is manipulable and subjective. It rests heavily upon the
parties' evaluation of the facts when there is not much time to eval-
uate them. As a principle, it does not inform the deliberations for a
preliminary injunction in any meaningful way.
Professor Leubsdorf5 ° has suggested minimizing risk as the justi-
fication for the injunctive standard: "[T]he preliminary injunction
standard should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of
rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision."5 This justifica-
tion, he argues, fully captures a court's dilemma in making a deci-
sion that, because of the truncated hearing, might mistakenly adjust
the rights and injuries of the parties. Consequently, Professor
Leubsdorf and Judge Posner, who adopts his theory, 2 emphasize
success on the merits over the other factors in the injunctive stan-
dard. But when courts focus on the merits, they undermine the
traditional function of interlocutory relief, that is, relieving the
moving party of injuries that cannot be remedied after trial. This
forces the preliminary injunction to do procedural work it ought
not do-the preliminary injunction hearing becomes a mini-trial on
the merits of the case.
53
This Article adopts a third statement of purpose: the prelimi-
nary injunction should create54 a state of affairs that will best give
49 See D. LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 403-05 (citing cases).
50 Leubsdorf, supra note 8.
51 Id. at 540-41.
5 2 See infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text.
53 Hammond, supra note 11, at 271-72, has also criticized Leubsdorf's proposal. He
observes that error can occur in any court decision, although he concedes that the risk is
greater with the preliminary injunction. He asserts that Leubsdorf's statement of pur-
pose asks the judge to engage in the impossible task of second guessing. This rationale
for the preliminary injunction leads to quantification of the standard in a way that is not
useful in most cases. Id. at 272.
54 1 use the term "create" intentionally. The term "preserve" tends to revive the
discredited status quo idea, while the term "create" encourages the growth of the discre-
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effective relief to the parties when the case has been fully heard on
the merits." The court should deliberately engage in a debate as to
what will best accommodate the often conflicting interests of the
parties, while preserving its ability to render a meaningful final deci-
sion. The touchstone here is that the relief be effective.
This approach has several advantages. It ends the resort to out-
moded historical formulas such as preserving the status quo or the
mandatory/permissive distinction. By forcing the court to focus on
the facts and the consequences of relief, it encourages the court to
flexibly exercise its discretion. Where the focus is on creating effec-
tive interlocutory relief, the court should feel relatively free to ex-
periment with its order. For example, it may want to incorporate
features such as reporting requirements or staggered timelines, or it
could impose conditions on more than one party.
Professor Leubsdorf asserts that this statement of purpose is am-
biguous and confusing because it is unclear whether it is a rule
based on avoiding a moot case or whether it forces the court to
focus on injuries that cannot be cured after trial.56 Professor Leub-
sdorf is being disingenuous; courts are referring to the second set of
affairs. He notes that the court cannot always protect its ability to
decide. Professor Leubsdorf concludes that this statement of pur-
pose is just another way to focus on the parties' legal injuries, and
that the courts ought to focus on the merits, which allows them to
assess those legal injuries. Professor Leubsdorf's criticisms are met
by encouraging the court to be more creative when drafting its or-
der. Under any purpose, there will likely be situations where the
court cannot tailor relief. But by focusing on the unique circum-
stances of each case, the court is more apt to design a successful
preliminary injunction than if it looks solely at the merits.57
B. Success on the Merits
Along with a showing of irreparable injury, a showing of success
tionary or flexible uses of this remedy. The standard I propose will encourage the
courts to devise and draft more creative and flexible preliminary injunctions. See infra
text accompanying notes 73-78.
55 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2947, at 423-27; Hammond, supra note
11, at 278; Developments in the Law, Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1058 (1965)
[hereinafter Injunctions].
56 Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 545.
57 Unlike Professor Leubsdorf and Judge Posner, whose preliminary injunction stan-
dard primarily emphasizes an examination of the merits, I focus on the facts. Focusing
on the facts preserves the traditional function of equity-a remedy which can be respon-
sive to facts rather than constrained by rules.
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on the merits is the cornerstone of preliminary injunctive relief.18
This factor tests the legitimacy of plaintiff's legal claim. At the
very least, it prevents the court from dealing with frivolous suits,
and it protects the legal interests of the nonmoving party.59 None-
theless, this factor has caused several problems. While its meaning
is relatively apparent, it is not at all clear how much "success" the
plaintiff must prove. Must the moving party show a prima facie
case? A likelihood of success? A serious question? A related issue
is how far courts should inquire into the merits in a preliminary
proceeding.' This in turn raises the question of the court's ability
to predict the outcome of a case after a necessarily sketchy presenta-
tion of the legal issues.
Success on the merits should be de-emphasized, although not
completely abandoned. 6' An overemphasis on merits has led to
procedural abuse of the preliminary injunction. With the growing
federal case backlog, the preliminary injunction has become a de-
vice for parties to get a quick hearing on their case.62 Once the
parties make and debate a high level showing on the merits, the
decision entered may well end their dispute,63 especially where
there are no issues of fact. Given civil trial backlogs, this is under-
standable. 6' But the preliminary injunction is an interim remedy,
58 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 65.04[1].
59 "This is relevant because the need for the court to act is, at least in part, a function
of the validity of the applicant's claim." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2948, at
450.
60 This debate mirrors that which occurs when courts consider issues like standing or
reviewability. Although these are threshold determinations, courts struggle with how
far they should inquire into the merits in order to resolve a standing issue.
61 Wolf, supra note 6, at 230-33, 235-36, and to a lesser extent, Hammond, supra note
11, at 278-82, argue that courts should abandon the merits test. I am tempted to join
them, but because I think that it would creep back into the standard under the guise of
another component which would undermine my concern for candor and clarity within
the standard, at this time I reject this position. Moreover, inclusion of "success on the
merits" does have the symbolic value of warning courts and litigators of their Article
III duties to address real cases and controversies.
62 Fiss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 2, at 361 n.1; Hammond, supra note 11, at 251.
63 Even in situations where the court might not enter an injunction, the tenor of the
court's decision, and its evaluation of the merits, may well lead the parties to settle the
case. This is particularly dangerous where, despite a high showing on the merits, the
court has erred. "Such premature and improper assessments of the merits may precipi-
tate unnecessary concessions by the losing party, and lead to settlements which other-
wise would not occur." Wolf, supra note 6, at 232.
64 This phenomenon led the English courts to reduce their emphasis on the merits.
American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd., 1975 App. Cas. 396. In that case, the House of
Lords held that the moving party need only show a serious question for trial. For
comment on this case, see Hammond, supra note 11, at 249-59; Leubsdorf, supra note 8,
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not a procedural shortcut.6 5 Using the injunction in this fashion
obscures its primary purpose: to prevent irreparable harm to the
moving party before the court can conduct a full trial on the merits.
Other procedural devices exist for those who want quick resolu-
tion of the merits. Where the parties have sufficiently developed the
issues for a final resolution, they can move to consolidate the pre-
liminary hearing with the full trial.66 Either party can file this mo-
tion. Especially when there are no disputed facts, this route makes
more efficient use of scarce judicial resources. Similarly, where dis-
puting parties seek to clarify their legal rights, a declaratory judg-
ment action may be more appropriate.67 This remedy is especially
useful where one party believes it has a strong legal claim, yet there
is not enough injury to trigger the irreparable injury requirements
for injunctive relief.68 The growth of alternate dispute resolution
also provides hope for those who want to resolve their disputes
quickly. It may be that, in certain cases, mediation or arbitration is
more desirable.69
Another traditional justification for emphasizing the merits was
to provide an insurance policy for the defendant. By requiring a
strong showing of probability of success at trial, courts sought to
minimize the risk of error and to allow the defendant to carry on
legal activities. But courts can protect the defendant without en-
gaging in a far-reaching inquiry into the merits or running the risk
of erroneously denying the moving party some relief.
The protective device is the bonding requirement of Federal Rule
65(c). 7 ° It requires the moving party, in exchange for access to pre-
at 539-40. Hammond, supra note 11, at 250-51, notes that prior to American Cyana-
mid, motions for preliminary injunctions had become mini-trials. The problem with
using preliminary injunctions for quick trials on the merits is probably even more press-
ing in this country because we recognize more claims than the English. Id. at 259-60.
65 The courts could, as a matter of policy, decide that it is appropriate for the prelimi-
nary injunction to function this way. But this is not reflected in the Federal Rules nor
does it appear in the case law.
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2); see also Wolf, supra note 6, at 233-34.
67 Declaratory judgments are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1982 & Supp. V
1987). Decisions rendered on such cases "have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree." Id. § 2201(a). There must be, however, an "actual controversy." Id.; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
68 Plaintiffs need not show irreparable injury to obtain declaratory relief. See D.
LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 442 n.2 (citing Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R.R. v.
Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933)).
69 There are some differences between these two procedures. For example, in media-
tion the parties control the outcome, while in arbitration, the arbitrator issues the
decision.
70 The Federal Rules require the "giving of security by the applicant" before a pre-
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liminary relief, to provide "insurance" for the defendant if the in-
junction turns out to be mistaken. The court can adjust the bond
requirement according to the moving party's showing on the merits.
For example, in cases where the showing is weak, the court should
require a bond7 and determine as carefully as possible a reasonable
amount.
7 2
A second, often ignored, protective device is the process of pre-
liminary injunction drafting.73 The court should employ the full
range of its discretion and be willing to try creative drafting solu-
tions. The erosion of many of the historical shibboleths about or-
ders make this easier. For example, courts have largely abandoned
the distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions.74
At the same time, contemporary equity practice has led to a grow-
ing appreciation of injunctive order flexibility.75 A court can use
discretion and flexibility to tailor a remedy which addresses the le-
gitimate interests of both plaintiff and defendant. As an illustration,
suppose a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the use of loudspeakers in defend-
ant's business. The court could: (1) grant plaintiff's requested re-
lief in its entirety, pulling the plug on the loudspeakers; (2) grant
liminary injunction may be issued. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c); see also Dobbs, Should Secur-
ity b Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunctive Relief?, 52 N.C.L. REV.
1091 (1974).
71 Although FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) talks in mandatory terms, courts often waive the
bond requirement for the moving party. This is another degree of discretion which
should be re-evaluated. There are two tensions here: on one hand, defendants want
some form of protection if the injunction should prove erroneous, especially where their
undertaking is expensive. On the other hand, an automatic bond requirement may de-
prive indigent and middle income plaintiffs of a remedy. One could also argue that a
strict bonding requirement might chill new or novel claims. There are some ways to
resolve this dilemma. A bond which varies with the merits will provide one compro-
mise. This requirement will place more pressure on the court to draft careful orders
and to seek out other protective devices. Also, to the extent that we explicitly make a
public policy exception to relieve plaintiffs of their bond requirements, these claims will
go forward.
72 The bond represents the full amount of the plaintiff's liability. In this sense, it
resembles liquidated damages in that it limits the amount the defendant can recover.
73 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). This rule describes the form and scope of the order. It
requires only that the order describe the restrained acts in reasonable detail and give
reasons for its issuance.
74 Black, supra note 6, at 13-25. Mandatory injunctions order a party to act; prohibi-
tory injunctions order a party to refrain from acting. Historically, courts were reluctant
to issue mandatory injunctions, and would go to great lengths to make what was essen-
tially a mandatory order appear to be prohibitory. Id. at 6; see also Injunctions, supra
note 55, at 1061-63.
75 Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REV. 132 (1981); Injunctions,
supra note 55, at 1064-69; see also 0. Fiss, supra note 9 (describing the impact that the
civil rights cases have had on equity practice).
[Vol. 68, 1989]
Preliminary Injunctions
partial relief, setting hour and/or decibel limits for the use of the
loudspeakers; (3) deny plaintiff's proposed relief and substitute its
own relief, for example, order defendant to install soundproofing;
or, (4) order defendant to work out a solution which addresses
plaintiff's injury.76 Within the time constraints imposed by the pre-
liminary injunction, the court may seek drafting help from the par-
ties themselves, a master, or a court appointed expert.77 The court
can use all of these techniques to vary relief granted according to
the parties' showings on the merits and irreparable injury.7"
Two final sources of protection come from the proposed standard
itself. First, with the balancing formula, a weak case on the merits
must be offset by a stronger case of irreparable harm. Plaintiff must
also bear the burden in these cases. Second, balancing the harms
also protects the defendants. If they show that an injunction will
harm them more than the plaintiff, the court may deny the injunc-
tion.79 The competing harms, however, must truly be balanced
against one another. Meeting some threshold of defendant harm
should not necessarily bar plaintiff's case where plaintiff's harm is
proportionately larger.80 Coupling both forms of balancing with
sensitive and careful drafting should alleviate these potential
problems.
This Article makes a case for de-emphasizing the role of a merits
analysis in preliminary proceedings. A question remains as to the
appropriate level of that showing, and by implication, the level of
the court's inquiry. The major objectives should be to prevent friv-
olous claims and to prevent the plaintiff from enlisting the court's
aid to illegitimately interfere with the rights of the nonmoving
party. The appropriate test should be that the moving party must
raise a serious question on the merits. This level of proof should not
chill novel, meritorious claims. On the other hand, it retains the
strength to prevent frivolous claims and thus protect both the court
and the nonmoving party. Furthermore, it does not encourage the
76 This example, called "experimental relief," is inspired by Injunctions, supra note
55, at 1063-64. It can often minimize harm to defendants, but its success depends on
their good faith. Id. at 1064.
77 Id. at 1067-69.
78 More drafting ideas are suggested in D. LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 811-18. Lay-
cock cautions that innovation can threaten other values. Id.
79 Wolf, who abandons the merits component, resorts to a strong balancing test. See
Wolf, supra note 6, at 229-30, 235-36. On the other hand, Hammond, supra note 11, at
279-81, rejects the balancing approach and suggests the court find the appropriate test
for each category of dispute.
80 Wolf, supra note 6, at 230.
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court to engage in a thorough analysis of the parties' legal rights, as
does the "probability of success on the merits" standard. When
read through the lens of Federal Rule 11, 1 which places a higher
duty on attorneys filing pleadings, it should avoid manipulation. 2
C. Irreparable Injury
Another component of the standard requires the plaintiff to show
that no adequate remedy exists at law or that they will suffer irrepa-
rable injury.83 With respect to this component, confusion exists as
to exactly what the moving party must show.84 In addition to defi-
nitional confusion, a lively debate continues as to whether irrepara-
ble injury ought to be a prerequisite for equitable relief.85
Several commentators argue that this prerequisite should be dras-
tically altered or abolished. Rather than perpetuate an inappropri-
ately automatic presumption for legal remedies, these scholars
argue that the two classes of remedies-legal and equitable-should
be co-equal and that the court ought to consider the relative advan-
tages of legal and equitable remedies before making a final deci-
sion." They observe that the rule is an antiquated holdover from a
time when the English legal system needed a sorting device that
would send some cases to law and others to equity. With the
merger of law and equity, this jurisdictional function, they argue, is
81 "Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record .... FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
82 See also Wolf, supra note 6, at 233.
83 1 prefer to call this term "irreparable injury." This is more likely to focus attention
on the primary issue of injury. It can also subsume the notion of inadequate remedies at
law. Where no legal remedy survives the lawsuit, there is irreparable injury.
84 In Roland Mach. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 1984), Judge Pos-
ner notes that courts usually list inadequacy and irreparability as the first component.
Sometimes they list them conjunctively, at other times, disjunctively. Thus, he notes
that it is not clear whether they mean the same thing. He concludes that, "in ordinary
equity parlance they do not." Id. at 383 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the case law
has not resolved this confusion, and the terms continue to be used both separately and
together. Similarly, Wolf, supra note 6, at 190-92, describes confusion in the First Cir-
cuit. Some cases equate adequacy and irreparability, while others treat them as in-
dependent factors.
85 The best known proponent of this view is Fiss. See 0. Fiss, supra note 9. For an
excellent and concise review of the position taken by Fiss, and a further development of
this view, see Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule (Book Review), 57
TEX. L. REV. 1065 (1979) [hereinafter Book Review]. See also Hammond, supra note
11, at 276; Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1990).
86 Rendleman, supra note 10; Book Review, supra note 85, at 1084.
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no longer needed. 87 The irreparable injury rule has become a ma-
nipulable concept that masks too much of what a court may really
be deciding.8 Finally, they object that the rule hides a preference
for economic remedies in which defendants compensate their
victims.89
These criticisms are well-taken. However, except for the manipu-
lation argument, they do not address the peculiar situation of the
preliminary injunction. 9° In this context, the irreparable injury
rule, especially as formulated below, serves an important due pro-
cess requirement. It requires the moving party to show an actual
justification for abridging the typical trial process. 9' Therefore, it
87 0. Fiss, supra note 9, at 1; Hammond, supra note 11, at 275-77; Injunctions, supra
note 55, at 997-1021.
88 See Book Review, supra note 85, at 1083, stating:
One might ask why so much effort should be expended attacking a rule that
makes so little difference when properly applied. The answer, of course, is
that the rule most often makes a difference when improperly applied. The
irreparable injury rule serves far more often as a cloak or prop for hostility to
the plaintiff's claim than as a way of choosing between two remedies of
roughly equal attractiveness.
Thus, by abolishing the rule, Laycock concludes that courts would be forced to face
the "real issues" between different remedies. Id. at 1084. See generally Rendleman,
supra note 10. While Rendleman agrees the term is manipulative, he suggests redefini-
tion rather than abolition. Thus, a judge faced with a choice between legal and equita-
ble remedies ought to consider the economic, moral, and administrative factors which
would make one remedy more preferable. In the end, the difference between Rendle-
man, on one hand, and Fiss and Laycock, on the other, is not that great. Both groups
want the courts to consider the same types of principles. Fiss and Laycock would prefer
to divide this analysis into separate principles, while Rendleman would subsume it
under the rubric of inadequacy. Laycock's arguments are fully developed in his two
new articles. See Laycock, supra note 85.
89 Book Review, supra note 85, at 1076-78.
90 Fiss suggests that we should distinguish the unique interlocutory nature of the
preliminary injunction, and the due process problems it presents, from the permanent
injunction. 0. Fiss, supra note 9, at 29, 45. He states that Frankfurter and Greene, see
infra note 142, based their case against the labor injunction by over-generalizing from
the interlocutory injunction. 0. Fiss, supra note 9, at 45-47. This suggests it may not
be possible to generalize from his observations about inadequacy and the permanent
injunction to the preliminary injunction.
91 Even Fiss concedes that it may be necessary to retain the irreparable injury re-
quirement in the interlocutory context:
A concern for [due] process might also justify an irreparable injury require-
ment for interlocutory injunctions: the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the
defendant would cause irreparable injury unless immediately enjoined. This
substantive requirement, presently found in most jurisdictions, invokes the
same verbal formula that applies to final injunctions, irreparable injury. There
is, however, a critical difference; in fact, as in the case of the prior restraint
doctrine, it would be best to recognize two distinct irreparable injury require-
ments-one for interlocutory and the other for final injunctions. In the con-
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should be retained as part of the preliminary injunction standard.
Even with the rule retained, no consensus has emerged as to its
meaning. More often than not, irreparable injury analysis can serve
as a cover for hostility to the moving party's claim. Therefore, the
irreparable injury rule should be reanalyzed, and then redefined, to
reflect its true functions in the preliminary injunction proceeding.
Once these functions are sorted out, a new definition for the doc-
trine--one which retains only those concerns that may be legiti-
mately addressed by the court--can emerge.
Historically, the irreparable injury rule, more often in the guise of
"no adequate remedy at law," served as a principle to allocate cases
between the courts of law and chancery. If a court could resolve
the moving party's case by the use of legal remedies, the party could
not obtain equitable relief. Equity was viewed as a subordinate
remedy. Over time, this preference for legal remedies developed
many doctrinal strands. Commonly referred to as the maxims of
equity, these doctrines inform the content of the rule to this day.
For example, it is typically said that equity will not enjoin a crime.
This shorthand expression describes the special due process protec-
tions afforded to the alleged criminal, such as jury trials, which eq-
uity cannot provide. Similarly, where the defendant is insolvent,
equity will act because the legal remedy is deemed inadequate. The
defendant's insolvency inhibits the plaintiff's ability to receive an
effective remedy.92
Courts should discontinue the practice of conclusorily invoking
these maxims without further inquiry. Instead, a judge should dis-
cern whether the rationale behind the maxim applies in a particular
case. If, for example, in the criminal context, there is no compro-
mise of defendant's due process rights and criminal sanctions will
not fully address the need for preliminary relief, it might be appro-
priate to enter a preliminary injunction.
The most pressing problem still remains: to define the irrepara-
ble injury rule and its relation, if any, to inadequate remedies at
text of final injunctions, the irreparable injury requirement subordinates the
injunction to noninjunctive remedies; in the interlocutory context, the irrepa-
rable injury requirement subordinates the interlocutory injunction to the rem-
edy sought at the end of the lawsuit, a remedy that might be either injunctive
or noninjunctive (such as damages). In the interlocutory context, the irrepa-
rable injury requirement could be viewed as protective of the right to be heard;
in the final context, it serves no such purpose.
0. Fiss, supra note 9, at 48.
92 For a fuller discussion of the operation of some of the maxims, see 0. Fiss, supra
note 9, at 38-45; Injunctions, supra note 55, at 997-1021.
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law.9" Part of the problem with the irreparable injury rule is that it
performs at least four functions in addition to the historical gloss
described above. First, the irreparable injury rule requires the exist-
ence or threat of an injury before relief can be granted. Second, it
describes the nature of injuries which can be redressed by prelimi-
nary injunctions. Third, it attempts to measure the degree of injury
required for relief. And finally, it describes a timing function. An
examination of each of these four functions follows.
First, the touchstone of the preliminary injunction is that it pre-
vents injury to the moving party before trial. The existence or
threat of actual injury is an essential element of irreparable injury.
The injury cannot be speculative or feared.94 This requirement
serves the interests of the parties and the court. For plaintiff, the
preliminary injunction provides a legitimate way to seek the aid of
the court in devising interim and emergency relief. Plaintiff need
not resort to self-help or private, possibly extortionate, negotiations
with the opposing party.95 For the nonmoving party, there may be
a compelling reason to forgo some of the traditional due process
protections afforded in a full trial on the merits. For the court, the
doctrine allows it to fulfill the article III requirement to hear cases
and controversies. The injury requirement means that the court
will be involved in a live dispute.96
Second, the irreparable injury rule categorizes the rights or inju-
93 The best resolution of this confusion occurs in Book Review, supra note 85, at
1070-72. The point is that inadequacy and irreparability are two formulations of the
same rule. These differing formulations lead some to think they impose different re-
quirements and that the injury must be egregious, or irreparable. Thus, some see "ir-
reparable" as quantifying how inadequate the remedy must be. This view, Laycock
states, is incorrect. The correct full statement of inadequacy, in his view, is as follows:
"1. Equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at law. 2. 'Adequate remedy'
means a remedy as complete, practical, and efficient as the equitable remedy." Id. at
1071. Thus, if the court foresees any effective remedy at the conclusion of trial, be it
legal, equitable, or administrative, then it should deny the preliminary injunction.
94 This requirement is similar to the principle that moving parties cannot receive a
modification of an injunction because of mere dissatisfaction; there must be a relevant
change in the situation. See Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105-06, 1109-10 (1986).
95 This is not to discourage negotiation or other legitimate means of private settle-
ment. There are times, however, when resort to legitimate private means of settlement
will be inappropriate. For example, unequal bargaining strength may necessitate court
resolution to temper the inequalities between the parties. Similarly, it may be inappro-
priate for private parties themselves to adjust important federal civil rights.
96 Without the requirement of some injury, a motion for a preliminary injunction can
become nothing more than an advisory opinion on legal rights or a mini-trial on the
merits. See supra text accompanying notes 58-82. Such functions are best served by
other devices.
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ries the court will address. This is where the rule is most open to
manipulation and suffers from the most doctrinal incoherence. 97
Additionally, this aspect of the rule tends to overlap with determi-
nations of success on the merits. Some courts conflate an injury
with a legal right. At the very least, one must recognize that equity
now protects personal as well as property rights. 98 The problem is,
what personal rights, or for that matter, what other rights, should
the court protect?
Professor Rendleman's article on inadequacy99 best develops a
principled, modern treatment of the factors which a court may use
to determine whether irreparable injury has occurred. His thesis is
that "inadequacy" is a doctrine which captures the legitimate
moral, economic, and administrative reasons for granting relief"'° °
Because the courts have "altered their application of the inadequacy
prerequisite without changing their terminology,"' 1  Professor
Rendleman undertakes the task of describing what the courts actu-
ally do under these three broad categories. His analysis can provide
support for, and supply the content of, a modern and legitimate
irreparable injury rule.
A few examples will illustrate this approach. The economic fac-
tor reflects a judge's evaluation of whether the injury should be al-
lowed to occur and then compensated or redressed in some
97 Rendleman, supra note 10, at 347-48, 358.
98 Injunctions, supra note 55, at 998-1001 (tracing the erosion of the distinction be-
tween personal and property rights).
99 Rendleman, supra note 10. Although his discussion focuses on the inadequate
remedies at law rule, he views the phrases irreparable injury and inadequacy as
equivalent. Id. at 351.
10Id. at 346. Although Professor Rendelman's article addresses inadequacy in the
context of permanent injunctions, it also applies to the interlocutory setting. Although
this is probably the only setting in which it makes sense to retain the irreparable injury
rule, it could conceivably be discarded. If it were, explicit rules would need to be devel-
oped to cover all foreseeable situations. Professor Laycock agrees that it makes sense to
retain the rule for preliminary injunctions, but he abolishes the rule for permanent in-
junctions. Laycock, supra note 85. He concludes by listing a set of functional rules that
would take the place of the irreparable injury rule. For example, he proposes as rules
that relief would be impractical to implement or burdensome for the court to supervise,
thus outweighing the disadvantage to plaintiff of receiving only damages. Or that the
relief would deprive defendant of civil jury trial giving plaintiff no advantages over dam-
ages. Id. These two explicit rules give content to the analysis by Rendleman, supra.
Thus, one can either adopt Professor Rendleman's analysis and retain the doctrine with
the understanding that its content is supplied with legitimate considerations, or one
could dispense with the doctrine in the preliminary setting and generate a set of explicit
rules as Professor Laycock has done for permanent injunctions.
101 Rendleman, supra note 10, at 347.
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fashion.'° 2 A judge might want to consider whether the alleged in-
jury can ever be measured in dollars, whether damages or a later
permanent injunction would better deter or vindicate interests, or
whether a subsequent remedy would necessarily afford too little or
too much relief. Similarly, economic considerations may force pri-
vate bargaining under the guise of the injunction proceedings." 3 A
judge may want to evaluate whether this is the appropriate time to
begin such a process.
Moral factors, on the other hand, focus the court's attention "on
the weight of the plaintiff's substantive interest."'" Although this
factor applies more in a choice between legal and equitable reme-
dies, it is also relevant in the preliminary stages of relief. This fac-
tor would allow a court to determine an interest to be so important
that it should continue without interruption, even the interruption
that would result from a full trial on the merits. It would also en-
courage candid consideration of the "public aspirations" expressed
in the constitution, statutes, or public policy.
Finally, the court should consider administrative factors before
awarding preliminary relief.'05 Two major concerns inform this
category: the jury trial and enforcement. In the preliminary set-
ting, the judge should consider whether the order may interfere
with a subsequent trial by jury. If it will, the relief may have to be
denied or the order narrowly tailored to preserve jury triable issues.
The court should also evaluate its ability to enforce its order.
Although people generally obey injunctions, there may be special
circumstances, for example, a hostile defendant, that suggest that
the court's ability to preserve the situation for decision is limited.
Professor Rendleman's view has several advantages, and it is con-
sistent with the qualities of the proposed standard. First, the courts
and parties are encouraged to focus on the actual issues presented
by the facts rather than to invoke worn out maxims or engage in
arguments which beg the question. Second, candor in decisions,
and their concomitant legitimacy, are promoted. Third, by expos-
ing the "intellectual process," it serves to constrain the discretion of
the court.'0 6 On the other hand, unlike a narrow formula, it still
leaves the trial court with a fair degree of latitude. It is not neces-
102 Id. at 348-52.
'
0 3 Id. at 351-52.
10Id. at 352.
105 Id. at 353-58.
o6Id. at 358.
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sarily a "conservative" process. That is, it does not freeze into the
rule a particular set of values. Rather, it encourages an open debate
as to whether plaintiff has presented a cognizable injury which the
court can address. This is especially important in the preliminary
injunction context. Many of these cases present novel theories or
describe novel injuries. Rather than allowing the judge to hide be-
hind a conclusion of irreparability, Rendleman's approach requires
at least an initial debate and evaluation of new injuries and their
place in our substantive and remedial schemes.
As its third function, irreparability defines the degree of harm
that plaintiff must show. As Professor Laycock points out, inade-
quacy and irreparability are actually the same requirements.107
They are not separate nor does the term "irreparability" suggest
any special quantity for the amount of required injury. Instead, the
court should only compare remedies to search for ones that are "as
complete, practical, and efficient" as the proposed remedy.l°8 This
means comparing the preliminary injunction with other remedies
that might be available after a full trial on the merits. Because the
relevant comparison is between the preliminary injunction and post-
trial remedies, the court should consider any equitable as well as
legal remedies. For example, if a well-drafted permanent injunction
can redress all of the moving party's alleged interim injury, no pre-
liminary injunction should issue."9
The plaintiff still must allege some irreparable harm in order to
secure a preliminary injunction. There is no reason to abridge, even
temporarily, defendant's legal rights if plaintiff will suffer no irrepa-
rable injury before or during the trial process. Even if plaintiff can
show a likelihood of success on the merits, no preliminary injunc-
tion should be granted unless the plaintiff also demonstrates some
irreparable injury. To do otherwise perverts this remedy and fur-
ther encourages procedural abuse. This requirement is also consis-
tent with the purpose of this provisional remedy." 0
Finally, the irreparable injury requirement captures two timing
factors. The first, and most important, is that the court can only
evaluate alleged harm which will occur before the dispute is re-
107 Book Review, supra note 85, at 1070-72.
108 Id. at 1071; see also Rendleman, supra note 10, at 346. A reformation for the
preliminary context might be: if a post-trial remedy, either equitable or legal, can com-
pletely, practically, and efficiently address all harm alleged by plaintiff to accrue before
and during trial, then a preliminary injunction is not necessary.
109 See Wolf, supra note 6, at 229.
11 0d.
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solved on the merits. This timing element is the raison d'etre for
the preliminary injunction. Second, the injury must be imminent.
This is not part of the irreparable injury requirement; rather, it is
another way of saying that the case must be ripe in an equitable
sense. This is a separate condition for granting any injunction, and
it overlaps with irreparable injury.
D. Balance of Harms
The third component of most preliminary injunction formulas is
the balance of harms."' This is probably the least controversial
part of the formula and certainly the least discussed. Nonetheless,
the balance of harms serves an important function. It allows the
nonmoving party to present evidence of harms they will suffer if the
injunction is entered erroneously. The court must then compare
these allegations of harm to those presented by the moving party.
Where the right to a full trial has been abridged, this component of
the standard guarantees that the nonmoving party will be heard. In
conjunction with the other factors, it also acts to minimize the
amount of harm that can be inflicted on either party. For example,
the relative showing of harm can be used to adjust the terms of the
preliminary order." 2 Thus, it can act as a constraint on the court's
discretion to design relief. Similarly, apprising the court of relative
harms should also alert it to the possibility that one party may use
the proceedings to extort a settlement.' 13
E. Public Interest
Until the turn of the century, neither American nor British courts
considered the impact a preliminary injunction might have on the
public interest.' This factor allows the parties to allege-and the
court to consider-how the award of injunctive relief will affect
either the interests of individuals or communities not parties to the
litigation or the interests of society generally. This consideration
can be problematic. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower fed-
"1 This is distinguishable from the balance of hardships, which is an equitable de-
fense. The defense operates to relieve a defendant from the imposition of a permanent
injunction even where there is proven liability. This occurs when the defendant shows
that the injunction would cause them harm disproportionate to their liability to the
plaintiff.
112 See Wolf, supra note 6, at 230.
113 Injunctions, supra note 55, at 1006.
114 See Hammond, supra note 11, at 248; Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 539. The public
interest continues to be predominantly an American concern, particularly in statutory
areas such as antitrust, labor, and environmental law.
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eral courts have defined what public interest means in this con-
text." 5 For example, there is no set rule defining requisite proof of
a valid public interest nor how much weight it should be given.
Needless to say, parties should always allege harm to the public
interest as a way of giving additional weight to their personal
claims. But how should the court respond when both parties allege
such harm? In preliminary proceedings, limited time is available to
determine which party's version of the public interest is factually
accurate. Moreover, invoking the public interest as a reason for
granting or denying an injunction may disguise and superficially le-
gitimate a judge's or party's personal agenda.1 16 Nonetheless, some
constraints on the use of the public interest do exist. At the very
least, the public interest cannot contravene constitutional or sub-
stantive law." 7 Additionally, if time permits, the procedural rules
allow the addition of parties who may present their own evi-
dence.' Full consideration of the role of the public interest is be-
yond the scope of this Article, however, these brief comments
suggest reasons to be wary of its unprincipled use and extension.
IV
THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE FACTORS
Once the components of the test are defined, the next task is to
describe their relationship to each other. The sequential test, the
alternatives test, and the balancing test describe the three basic
ways in which the factors are related to one another." 9 A sampling
of Ninth Circuit cases illustrates these three approaches and aids in
the evaluation of their relative merits. It reveals that the balancing
test is the one best suited to preliminary injunction litigation.
A. The Sequential Test
Sierra Club v. Hickel 120 represents a typical and widely cited ex-
ample of the sequential test.' 2 ' Plaintiff Sierra Club sought to pre-
115 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
116 See Jost, supra note 94, at 1121.
17 See id. at 1148; Plater, supra note 12, at 588-91.
118 FED. R. Civ. P. 19 and 20 provide for joinder and permissive joinder, respec-
tively. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 covers intervention and FED. R. Civ. P. 23 allows for class
actions.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
120 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972). Morton is better known for the principles it sets forth on standing.
121 Another widely cited example is Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259
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vent Walt Disney Productions from developing Mineral King
Valley in California. It alleged that the Forest Service and the De-
partment of Interior had not fully considered the effect the project
would have on the valley or the adjoining Sequoia National Park. If
the Sierra Club wanted a preliminary injunction, the court said, it
must show a "strong likelihood or 'reasonable certainty'" of pre-
vailing on the merits and irreparable injury; the court must then
"balance the damage to both parties."' 22 Because it appeared that
all of the required permits had been obtained legally, the court
found that Sierra Club had not shown success on the merits and
was not entitled to an injunction.
This case demonstrates two typical features of a sequential test.
First, because the court sees this as an extraordinary and unique
remedy, it requires plaintiff to justify the request by a heavy burden
of proof.' 23 Thus, the court requires a "convincing presentation" of
both irreparable injury and success on the merits.'24 Second, failure
to prove either success on the merits or injury is sufficient to justify
withholding an injunction. For example, the plaintiff might demon-
strate that irreparable harm is certain to occur but have a weak case
on the merits. Under the sequential test, the court is fully justified
in withholding relief in these circumstances. Of the three ap-
proaches, the sequential test is the strictest. 2
5
The main problem with the sequential test is its requirement of a
high proof level on all factors. This test overemphasizes the merits
of a case. The necessity of proving a high likelihood of success re-
quires excessive and premature judicial involvement with the mer-
its. This means that relief may be unavailable to deserving parties.
For example, in the short time before the hearing the parties may
have been unable to muster sufficient evidence or precedent. 26 Sec-
F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). This case is discussed by Black, supra note 6, at
26-29, and Wolf, supra note 6, at 184-87.
122 433 F.2d at 33 (citations omitted). Subsequently, a more streamlined version of
this test was stated in Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court rearranged the Hickel decision into a more traditional format and stated the test
as follows: "The considerations in determining whether to grant or deny injunctive
relief are threefold: (1) have the movants established a strong likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) does the balance of irreparable harm favor the movants; (3) does the
public interest favor granting the injunction?" Id. at 1167. This is a fairly typical for-
mulation of the traditional test.
123 Hickel, 433 F.2d at 33.
124 Id.
125 For other discussions of the sequential test, see Black, supra note 6, at 26-29;
Hammond, supra note 11, at 261-62.
126 Castles, supra note 6, at 1373.
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ond, this concern with the merits may obscure the very real injury
that plaintiff is suffering. Because the factors cannot be traded off
against each other, even a crushing and certain specter of harm will
not overcome a weak showing on the merits. This may encourage
courts to develop ways around the sequential test in order to relieve
plaintiffs from irreparable injury.' 27 Such a result would undermine
the legitimacy of the test, as well as violate the qualities of a good
standard, especially that of candor.
B. The Alternatives Test
A second approach, the alternatives test, is illustrated in William
Inglis & Sons Baking v. ITT Continental Baking.128 Plaintiffs al-
leged that their competitors engaged in discriminatory and below-
cost pricing of their "private label" bread products. The district
court, applying the traditional test,'29 denied the injunction for fail-
ure to show probability of success on the merits, even though it did
find irreparable harm. Describing this as an "extremely complex
case," the appellate court stated that it could not find an abuse of
discretion in the lower court's use of the traditional standard.' 3°
Nonetheless, the court reversed and remanded, stating the lower
court should employ the following test: " 'One moving for a pre-
liminary injunction assumes the burden of demonstrating either a
combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable
injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hard-
ships tips sharply in his favor.' "'31
127 Black, supra note 6, at 48.
128 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975). The forerunner to this mature statement of the alter-
natives test is Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, 456 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.
1972). The Ninth Circuit cases rely on cases from the Second Circuit, where this test
was formulated. See Sonesta Int'l Hotels v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.
1973); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
129 The district court stated the test as follows:
[B]efore plaintiff can prevail the court must find that:
1. there will be immediate and irreparable harm if the injunctive relief is not
granted;
2. plaintiff has a probability of success on the merits;
3. in balancing the equities, the defendants would not be harmed more than
plaintiff is helped by the injunction; and
4. it would be in the public's interest to grant the injunction.
Inglis and Sons Baking v. ITT Continental Baking, 389 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (N.D.
Cal.), rev'd, 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975).
13OInglis, 526 F.2d at 88.
131 Id. (quoting Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir.
1973)). As in Costandi, the Inglis court relied exclusively on Second Circuit cases as
support for the alternatives test.
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The difference between the alternatives test and the traditional
test can be sketched by hypothesizing what may have occurred in
the lower court. Under the traditional test, the plaintiffs lose be-
cause they cannot prove a very high probability of prevailing on the
merits. The court does not consider their proofs on the other fac-
tors because, under the traditional test, failure on any one part of
the test results in a failure to meet the entire test. Under the second
prong of the alternative test, however, their burden is considerably
lighter. Because the lower court believes that the plaintiffs have
proven irreparable harm, it appears likely that they could demon-
strate that the balance of hardships tipped in their favor.132 But
more importantly, at least from the plaintiffs' point of view, they no
longer need to prove "probable" success on the merits. Rather, the
burden has been lowered to showing that "serious questions are
raised." This less exacting standard is a real departure from the
sequential test because it can result in the award of a preliminary
injunction for the moving party. Also, because of the two prong
nature of the test, plaintiffs can focus their case where their argu-
ments are stronger, either on the merits or on irreparable injury.
They need not prove both. 133
132 The lower court did not balance the equities in Inglis due to plaintiff's failure to
show success on the merits. Thus, we do not know if defendants faced an even greater
irreparable harm than the plaintiffs. If defendants could show this, e.g., by showing
they would go out of business, they could defeat plaintiff's application for a preliminary
injunction.
133 Note that although the Inglis court referred to the traditional test, it did not de-
cide what role the test would play in future cases; that is, the traditional test was not
overruled. In at least two cases decided after Inglis, the Ninth Circuit used the tradi-
tional test. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.
1977); Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1976). Both of these cases, like
Hickel, are environmental cases. Both use the following test for determining whether a
preliminary injunction should issue: (1) whether the movants have established a strong
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether the balance of irreparable harm favors
the movants, and (3) whether the public interest favors granting the injunction. The
difference from the alternatives test lies in the higher threshold of proof for the likeli-
hood of success on the merits and the consideration of the public interest. The
Hathaway court discussed the alternative test in a footnote:
Assuming without deciding that the alternative[s] test for injunctive relief
adopted by this Circuit in [Inglis] applies to environmental cases, we are of the
opinion that our discussion regarding the standard test also demonstrates that
appellants failed to show "either a combination of probable success and the
possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the
balance of hardships tips sharply in [their] favor."
Id. at 1167 n.7 (citation omitted). Presumably, these courts continued to use the tradi-
tional test because it included a consideration of the public interest. This factor has
played a central role in many environmental disputes. Additionally, the Gribble court
suggests that under NEPA, the standards for granting an injunction are more liberal.
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Although the two alternatives test is an interesting response to
the inflexibility of the traditional sequential test, it has problems of
its own. It fails in its second prong to focus on the need for some
irreparable injury.' 34 An injunction should not be entered where
plaintiff has no injury. To do so undermines the legitimacy of the
preliminary injunction. Furthermore, both prongs set too low a
threshold for injury. For instance, a possibility of injury should not
involve a court. This test has become an overreaction to the harsh-
ness of the traditional sequential rule. The preliminary injunction
becomes too potent a weapon for litigious parties. Most of those
who have reviewed the alternatives test have dismissed it as overly
liberal or even "aberrant."
1 3 5
C. The Balancing Test
The case of Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Na-
tional Football League "6 illustrates the balancing test. At issue in
this case was the attempt by the National Football League to pre-
vent the Oakland Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. The appel-
late court reversed the lower court's award of a preliminary
injunction because plaintiff, L.A. Coliseum, had not shown irrepa-
rable injury and because the court had not balanced defendant's
harm. 137 It then set forth its balancing test: "[A] minimal showing
565 F.2d at 552 n.2. Thus, both courts may have felt that the alternatives test did not
offer any advantages for deciding issues in environmental litigation.
Inglis was followed in the subsequent case of Aguirre v. Chula Vista Sanitary Serv.,
542 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1976). In this employment discrimination case, the district court
denied relief because plaintiffs failed to show probability of success on the merits under
the traditional test. The court, citing Inglis, noted that an alternatives test existed and
remanded the case back to the district court for further consideration.
134 Some, however, feel that irreparable injury is implied in the balance of hardship
factor. See Castles, supra note 6, at 1364-65; Wolf, supra note 6, at 194 (irreparable
injury not required as a separate element, although present in the balance of harms).
But cf. Mulligan, Preliminary Injunction in the Second Circuit, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV.
831, 834 (1977) ("nothing explicit about irreparable injury").
135 Black, supra note 6, at 49; Hammond, supra note 11, at 262-63.
136 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Benda v. Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978). Both cases modify to the point of destruction
the alternatives test of Inglis. In Benda, the court described the alternatives test, not as
two separate tests, but as extremes of a continuum. 584 F.2d at 315. Concluding that
there must be some showing of success on the merits, the Benda court announced a
balancing test: "The critical element in determining the test to be applied is the relative
hardship to the parties. If the balance of harm tips decidedly toward the plaintiff, then
the plaintiff need not show as robust a likelihood of success on the merits as when the
balance tips less decidedly." Id. These two cases establish that plaintiff must show
some harm and some success on the merits.
13 7 Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 634 F.2d at 1202.
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on the merits is required even when the balance of harms tips decid-
edly toward the moving party. Conversely, at least a minimal tip in
the balance of the hardships must be found even when the strongest
showing on the merits is made."13 The balancing test, then, is a
halfway point between the sequential test's requirement of strong
proof of all factors and the alternatives test's seeming willingness to
dispense with proof of either irreparable harm or success on the
merits. Under a balancing test, the plaintiff must show both some
irreparable injury and some success on the merits. The threshold
required for either varies from circuit to circuit. Additionally, for
many courts, the showing of irreparable injury is necessarily im-
plied in the balance of hardships. A court considering a motion for
a preliminary injunction focuses its attention on the heart of the
balancing test, that is, the relative hardship of the parties.
The balancing test has several advantages. Because it is widely
used, it is an approach with which the courts are familiar.' 39 It
restores the focus on the potential harms to the parties and thus
grounds the test in its equitable origins. This focus is consistent
with a de-emphasis on the merits. That is, under a balancing test,
the merits are no longer conclusive in themselves; the court must
review the facts as well as the law. This encourages the parties to
engage in a deliberation that acknowledges the complexity of their
situation. The balancing test also promotes an appropriate degree
of flexibility. However, because it retains the requirements of prov-
ing some merit and irreparable harm, it does not turn the prelimi-
nary injunction hearing into a field day.
V
How MUCH DISCRETION?
Discretion pervades equity practice." . Historically, this discre-
tion was necessary because it provided equity litigants a necessary
138 Id. at 1203-04 (footnote omitted).
139 Moore's Federal Practice associates this test with the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth circuits. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 65.04[l]. Black, supra
note 6, at 30, states that it is used in the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits.
14°See 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 2, at 104. Professors Fiss and
Rendelman describe the many forms that discretion takes in injunctive litigation. Id. at
104-08. For example, they note the use of open-ended terms and the court's ability to
control the timing and amount of relief. In the context of judicial decisionmaking, they
define discretion to mean: "either the decision of the court is (1) not controlled by any
rules, or (2) not controlled by reasonably precise rules, or (3) that there is a lax standard
for appellate review." Id. at 107. This Article uses discretion in its second sense.
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pressure valve from the rigidity of the early common law system.
Modern procedure, however, merges law and equity, and many eq-
uitable doctrines now inform both substantive law and procedure.
Moreover, although the civil rights experience demonstrated the in-
junction's flexibility,' 4 1 other commentators point to the same ex-
perience as an example of discretion run wild, of judges invoking
equity to justify results.142 This issue presents another attribute of a
workable standard-the court's proper use of its discretion. "Too
much discretion may not only mean unequal law, but no law at all
,143
The optimal standard is based on a theory of bounded discretion.
Much of the traditional latitude given to the court in injunction
cases is worth retaining. This is a remedy which covers almost the
total spectrum of substantive law and is often on the cutting edge of
new legal theories. A judge should not, however, feel free to arrive
at unprincipled results merely by invoking equity. Rather, this
standard allows the judge flexibility and discretion within the con-
fines of a uniform standard, the terms of which have been openly
defined to cover only the legitimate concerns of decisionmaking. It
creates a common vocabulary for litigants and the courts and fo-
cuses deliberation on the relevant issues. Out of this should come
principled decisions that will uphold the legitimacy of the courts
and leave litigants feeling that they have been given a fair hearing.
In this Part, the Article explores the issue of discretion by
describing and analyzing the preliminary injunction standard pro-
posed by Judge Richard Posner. His standard provides for too
much, and too little, discretion. Additionally, by imposing the rhet-
oric of objectivity into the decisionmaking process, his standard
fails to meet the other criteria of a good standard. Thus, Posner's
model provides a useful opportunity to contrast it with the standard
proposed in this Article.
A. The Decisions
Judge Posner's formula for preliminary injunctions represents
141 See generally 0. Fiss, supra note 9.
142 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
14TH AMENDMENT 341-42 (1977); G. McDOWELL, supra note 44, at 121-22. These
criticisms are reminiscent of F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNC-
TION (1930), which led Congress to impose restraints on the ability of federal courts to
issue injunctions. The discerning historian will note that these criticisms come, ironi-
cally, from opposite ends of the political spectrum.
143 O. FIss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 2, at 104.
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perhaps the most dramatic change suggested among the circuits. I"
The Seventh Circuit case of American Hospital Supply v. Hospital
Products"' involved the breach of a distributor-supplier relation-
ship for medical products. American Hospital Supply, the spumed
distributor, sued for breach of contract and obtained a preliminary
injunction. Judge Posner upheld the injunction by utilizing the fol-
lowing formula: P X Hp (1 -P) X Hd, where P equals the plain-
tiff's probability of success and H equals harm.' 46 Noting that the
purpose of the standard was to minimize error, he disclaims any
intent to "force analysis into a quantitative straitjacket but to assist
analysis by presenting succinctly the factors that the court must
144 Two recent articles attack his formula. See Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness)
the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1987); Silberman, In-
junctions By The Numbers: Less Than The Sum Of Its Parts, 63 CHI.- KENT L. REV.
279 (1987). Professor Mullenix focuses on the formula's use as a procedural device.
Professor Silberman primarily criticizes the way in which the formula is used to exert
greater appellate scrutiny of preliminary injunctions. For a generalized critique of
Judge Posner's work, see K. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFI-
CIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 91-94 (1988).
145 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986). Judge Posner's interest in such an approach was
presaged in his opinion in Roland Mach. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (1984). On
the appeal of this antitrust suit, both parties contested the proper standard for granting
a preliminary injunction. Noting that "the relevant case law is in disarray in both this
and other circuits," Judge Posner addressed this issue in a very thoughtful opinion. Id.
at 382. After noting that all courts are in agreement on the basic factors, he listed seven
factors on which they coalesce, e.g., irreparable injury, success on the merits, etc. Id. at
386-90. Relying on the approach developed by Professor Leubsdorf, supra note 8,
although not citing it, Judge Posner opined that the task of the district court judge is to
minimize errors. He concluded:
The error of denying an injunction to someone whose legal rights have in
fact been infringed is thus more costly the greater the magnitude of the harm
that the plaintiff will incur from the denial and the greater the probability that
his legal rights really have been infringed. And similarly the error of granting
an injunction to someone whose legal rights will turn out not to have been
infringed is more costly the greater the magnitude of the harm to the defend-
ant from the injunction and the smaller the likelihood that the plaintiff's
rights really have been infringed.
Id. at 388. Judge Posner thus adopts a balancing test, the purpose of which is to avoid
the erroneous conferral of legal rights. This verbal formula later becomes the equation
in American Hosp. Supply v. Hospital Prod., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986). See also
Maxim's Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Roland balancing
formula).
146 American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593. Judge Posner had two aims in American
Hosp. Supply. First, is the rather uncontroversial proposition that equity should not be
standardless. Having established that proposition, he goes on to claim that because
there are standards by which the trial court is bound, traditional notions about a highly
deferential scope of review are unwarranted. Id. at 593-95. This in itself is an interest-
ing issue although beyond the scope of this Article. It is evidence, however, of his desire
to constrain trial court discretion. See, Silberman, supra note 144, at 299-303.
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consider in making its decision and by articulating the relationship
among the factors."' 47 He concluded that this is simply a "distilla-
tion of the familiar four (sometimes five) factor test."' 148  He then
asserts that the formula is universally applicable to all legal
claims. 149
A careful reading of American Hospital Supply gives a fuller ac-
count of Judge Posner's formula. 5' He states that the nature of the
right asserted, as well as the permanent remedy to which plaintiff is
entitled, may affect the weight assessed to each of the harms,
although he does not tell us how.' 1 ' Judge Posner also makes it
clear that transaction costs should be figured into the harm equa-
tion's factor.' 52 On the other hand, he does not factor in the rela-
147 American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593.
1481Id.
14 9 Id. at 594.
150 Leubsdorf, supra note 8, is the direct source of Judge Posner's standard. In his
article, Leubsdorf traces in careful detail the development of the preliminary injunction
standard and its presently muddled state. Id. at 525-40. He then develops a standard
for issuing preliminary injunctions, but unlike other writers, he grounds it on a theory
for shaping the standard. Id. at 526. He states that "the preliminary injunction stan-
dard should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors
incident to hasty decision," and that "only irreparable harm to legal rights should
count." Id. at 540-41. Not surprisingly, with this announced goal and definition of
harm, Leubsdorf's theory comes to focus on the merits determination section of the
standard. This underlying theory leads Leubsdorf to announce the following verbal
formula:
The court, in theory, should assess the probable irreparable loss of rights an
injunction would cause by multiplying the probability that the defendant will
prevail by the amount of the irreparable loss that the defendant would suffer if
enjoined from exercising what turns out to be his legal right. It should then
make a similar calculation of the probable irreparable loss of rights to the
plaintiff from denying the injunction. Whichever course promises the smaller
probable loss should be adopted.
Id. at 542 (footnote omitted). The estimate of harm is "intuitive," id. at 553-56, and he
concludes by noting procedural devices for minimizing harm.
Leubsdorf claims that his theory and resulting standard have several advantages over
their competitors. First, he states that this verbal formula restricts the court from mak-
ing intuitive assessments and vague generalizations. Id. at 543. This is because it forces
the court to attempt to make probabilistic calculations of success on the merits or at-
tempt to quantify the irreparable harm involved. Second, he believes that his theory is
more coherent because it precisely specifies the relationship between the components of
the standard. Id. at 544. He notes that recasting the standard this way removes anti-
quated relics such as the status quo from entering into deliberations. Id. at 546. Be-
cause of the substantial overlap between Professor Leubsdorf's position and Judge
Posner's, my comments can apply to both.
151 American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 594 (citing Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d
859, 866-67 (7th Cir. 1985), as an example of the rights affecting the weighting).
152 Transaction costs include items such as the costs of identifying "the parties with
whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the costs of the
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tive size differences of the two businesses in this case, concluding
that it is of "no legal significance."'153 In this case, because he found
the harms to be equal, the award came down to who had the better
case on the merits.154 Finally, Posner concludes that the court must
consider the public interest as part of the "H" term of the
formula.'55 Where plaintiff asserts the harm, it is part of plaintiff's
"H" term; conversely, when asserted by the defendant, it is added
to the right hand side of the equation.
After reiterating the standard for review, he applied this test with
careful attention to the facts and the merits. Judge Posner found
that the plaintiff did demonstrate the probability of substantial ir-
reparable harm. Although defendant Hospital Products might be
injured, its losses were protected by a bond entered as part of the
preliminary injunction.
Judge Posner's willingness to take on the thorny problem of a
standard for preliminary injunctions has met with some resistance
within the Seventh Circuit. Although much of Judge Swygert's dis-
sent in American Hospital Supply involves a difference over the in-
terpretation of the facts, he also criticizes Posner's formula. First,
Judge Swygert questions the utility of a formula in an area which
demands flexibility. The precision required by the formula, he as-
serts, is "antithetical to the underlying principles of injunctive re-
lief."' 56 He notes correctly that Judge Posner never tells us exactly
how to measure "P" or "H." Second, he points out that the
formula reaches a result which is inconsistent with the balancing
test advanced in Roland Machinery v. Dresser Industries. 157 He
notes that Roland required a higher showing of success on the mer-
bargaining process itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached." A. POLIN-
SKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1983). Thus, Posner explicitly
imports the vocabulary and assumptions of economic analysis into his formula.
153 American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 598.
154 Id. Posner asserts:
If the harms to the plaintiff and the defendant of denying and granting the
injunction, respectively, are equal, the injunction must be granted if the plain-
tiff has a better than 50 percent chance of winning the case, for then P in our
preliminary-injunction formula must exceed 1 - P, and therefore P X H, must
exceed 1 - P X Hd from the assumption that Hp = Hd.
15 5 Id. at 601.
156Id. at 609. Additionally, he could have said that it is illusory. Judge Posner,
however, concedes that he does not call for forcing decisions into mathematical strait-
jackets, and at no time in his opinion does he reduce the outcome to hard numbers. His
approach, however, does encourage that type of behavior by jurists and lawyers.
I57 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
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its where the harms are equal.1 1 8 Yet in American Hospital Supply,
Judge Posner concluded that where Hp = Hd, the plaintiff's
chance of winning must only be better than fifty percent. 5 9
Posner's formula has received a qualified reception in subsequent
Seventh Circuit decisions. In Lawson Products v. Avnet, Inc. , o the
court lauds Judge Posner's "exhaustive and scholarly examination
of the law of preliminary injunctions," finding his views in harmony
with the traditional flexible approach of judges within the circuit. 6 '
But the court cautions that the formula should not be rigidly fol-
lowed, suggesting that the judge will always need to conduct a
somewhat subjective evaluation of the factors involved in the case
rather than a quantification of them.'62 In fact, the court suggests
that it is paradoxical to require quantification of harm where the
presenting argument states that it cannot be quantified.'63 Finally,
the court notes that the formula does not incorporate the considera-
tions of equity or fairness which should guide all trial court
judges." 4 Correctness, in the sense of mathematical precision, is
not enough.' 65
B. Too Little Discretion
On the surface, Judge Posner's formula is remarkably similar to
the standard proposed in this Article. Both employ a balancing test
and traditional equity vocabulary, and both apply uniformly to all
types of cases. However, several salient differences exist. Judge
Posner's formula, particularly his goal of risk minimization, arises
from his project to bring economics to bear on procedure. 66 None-
158American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 607.
159 Id. at 598. To put it mathematically, although Posner endorses a rather tradi-
tional balancing test in his decisions prior to American Hosp. Supply, his algebraic
formula, which supposedly encapsulates this balancing approach, does not work that
way. Where Hp = Hd, the plaintiff prevails if P = 51% or more. This is hardly the
higher showing on the merits called for in Roland.
16 782 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1986).
161 Id. at 1432.
162 Id. at 1434-36.
16 3 Id. at 1434-35.
164 Id. at 1436.
165 Judge Posner's approach is also criticized in Brunswick Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d
271, 274 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986).
16 6 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 174-90 (3d ed. 1986). It is also
motivated by his analysis of the federal court system. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note
9; Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986). Posner's ostensi-
ble project addresses the growth of the federal court backlog, although his subtext is a
critique of judicial activism. R. POSNER, supra note 9, at 207. He aims to promote
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theless, both standards are inspired by the doctrinal incoherence in
this area. But by clothing his standard in the rhetoric of objectivity,
Judge Posner does not achieve as much coherence as he desires.
His approach falls short of the requirements for a workable stan-
dard and it overly limits the court's discretion.
First, the goal which Judge Posner selects-risk minimization-
is underinclusive because it fails to describe the full role of the pre-
liminary injunction. The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to
create a situation in which the judge can both give final relief and
remedy irreparable harm which may occur to the plaintiff before a
full trial on the merits. This encourages the court to be more flexi-
ble and is consistent with the point of an interlocutory remedy.
That is not to say that judges should feel free to err or that a stan-
dard should encourage error. It is, however, unrealistic to expect
judges to continually look over their shoulders for mistakes.167 At
the same time, it encourages judges to become overly involved in
the merits of the decision. Given the truncated nature of the hear-
ing, the parties cannot develop the merits in a way which makes this
type of inquiry fruitful. It also encourages the parties to use the
preliminary injunction to get quick decisions on the merits when
better methods exist. By focusing only on accuracy, this point of
view may inhibit the court from designing creative remedies that
protect the interests of all parties. The court may ignore values or
ideas which it could bring to bear on its task.
Second, this standard can be manipulated at either or both of two
points: an assessment of the "H," or harm, term and the assessment
of the "P, " or probability of success term. Although Judge Posner
candor, particularly when the court must exercise its discretion by drawing on extrale-
gal sources. Id. at 217-18. Posner feels that a self-restrained judge's opinion is more
likely to be candid than that of an activist judge. Unlike Posner, I would like to think
that candor has not been captured by any one particular style of judging. Both activism
and restraint are supported by political agendas that deserve exposure through candid
and open debate.
Posner argues that courts should be more willing to adopt rules rather than stan-
dards. Id. at 245. Rules are mechanically determinable facts, while standards require
"weighing several (nonquantitative) factors or otherwise making a judgmental, qualita-
tive assessment .... Negligence is a standard, strict liability a rule." Id. The use of
rules would increase legal certainty and reduce caseloads. Id. at 246. While acknowl-
edging that these proposals may be controversial, he argues that many procedural issues
are economic in character and could be improved by economic analysis. Id. at 294-95.
Procedural rules should attempt to minimize the costs of erroneous decisions and ad-
ministrative costs. Id. at 307-08. These values influence his formula for a preliminary
injunction.
167 See also Hammond, supra note 11, at 271-72.
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specifies the exact relationship between these factors and urges us to
approximate their values, he does not define them nor does he sug-
gest what legitimately irreparable harm means. If each court using
his standard defines harm differently, they perpetuate doctrinal in-
coherence. To the extent he imports economic notions such as
transaction costs, he introduces concepts which may be poorly un-
derstood by some portions of the practicing bar and courts. Both
results violate the norms for an optimal standard. Even aside from
the values implicit in these notions, this could upset the equality
between parties that flows from shared meanings.
Judge Posner also suggests that harm be quantified for the pur-
poses of analysis. This is counterintuitive to hundreds of years of
equity because the rationale for equity is to provide relief for non-
quantifiable injuries that could not be addressed by damages. If the
harm can be quantified, then the injunction should be denied. This
is because it fails the irreparable injury test, not because the moving
party has a lesser injury. Further, in close cases, this calculation
will inevitably become a subjective hunch. On the other hand, an
eagerness to quantify undermines harms that are difficult to mea-
sure, for example, civil rights and freedom of speech. Thus, either
the judge will have to guess about the value of these rights, 6 ' or the
nonquantifiable injuries will be inherently disadvantaged, that is,
their value will be underestimated when compared to ones which
can be quantified. This result is inconsistent with an interest in pre-
cision, and it is dangerous because of the way in which it can under-
mine a number of legal rights. Moreover, it is no better than a
traditional application of irreparable injury in that the assumptions
underlying the attempt to quantify may contain hidden values.
Although Professor Leubsdorf asserts that "the most manageable
part of the preliminary injunction decision is estimating the likeli-
hood of various results," '169 Posner's probability of success term is
open to many of the same criticisms outlined above. First, an as-
signment of likelihood of success provides a way for a less than can-
did judge to manipulate results by handicapping various causes of
action. This is problematic in the injunctive context, which is often
the battleground for new legal theories. Second, it ignores the inter-
play of success on the merits with protective devices such as crea-
tive drafting. It encourages the parties to adopt a winner-take-all
approach, when in reality there may be many ways to win, that is,
168 See Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 554.
169 Id. at 555.
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to be free from irreparable harm. This is crucial because in cases
where the harm values are equal, or nearly so, the merits determine
the result. Thus, as it pertains to either merits or harm, Judge Pos-
ner's standard is not an advance over older verbal formulas. It pro-
vides opportunities for the result-oriented jurist to hide and, most
paradoxically of all, although it proposes to limit the court's discre-
tion, the formula may allow it to enter through a quantitative back
door.
Finally, the formula imposes intolerable administrative burdens
on the courts and litigants. Although Posner acknowledges the
truncated nature of the proceedings, this formula can only protract
them. In order to make the requisite verbal estimates with any de-
gree of precision, the litigants must have a great deal of information
prior to the hearing. Such evidence is often unavailable. If it is
available, the parties should proceed directly to a full trial on the
merits. It also imposes assumptions and methods on the courts and
bar that are foreign to most attorneys. While attorneys and judges
learn how to do "shadow pricing" or factor "transaction costs" into
the harm term, mistakes may be made. The performance of addi-
tional analyses will also add to the cost and time of litigation. A
reading of Judge Posner's decisions will demonstrate how deeply
this embroils the court in the merits of the controversy. This takes
additional time and shifts the court's attention away from the pre-
vention of irreparable harm.
Overshadowing everything, however, is the impact of this
formula qua formula on the court's discretion. Although it appears
too discretionary, it might be more accurate to say that it hides too
many values and assumptions. To the extent those underlying val-
ues are made clear, it will reduce the court's ability to consider non-
quantitative factors or factors which are considered illegitimate by
the Leubsdorf/Posner calculus. In any event, once the quantifica-
tion is done, however it is done, the formula operates mechanically.
No flexibility is built into the formula, especially in close cases
where it is most needed. Additionally, because it purports to pre-
cisely select a winner and a loser, it discourages creative uses of the
preliminary injunction which a more flexible approach would en-
courage; it discourages compromise.
Courts should have a great deal of discretion in ruling on motions
for preliminary injunctions. This is necessary because of the wide
variety of contexts in which they arise, as well as the time con-
straints imposed on the court. Nonetheless, this discretion can be
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constrained or bounded at several points. First, this Article has at-
tempted to define terms in ways that are consistent with modem
practice and understanding. Second, it goes behind the meanings of
these terms to sort out the functions which each component of the
process plays. In doing so, it discards functions which are no longer
legitimate, for either historical or functional reasons. Third, this
Article tries to portray these factors in a way which will encourage
candid and open deliberation among the parties. For example, in
any proceeding, parties would be expected to litigate the effect and
application of these functions to the facts of their case. Fourth, by
insisting that the courts adopt one uniform standard for issuing in-
junctions, not only is their discretion limited, but additional benefit
accrues when the courts and parties use the same terms to talk
about the real issues. This should also aid appellate review and
serve as a final control on the lower courts. This standard should
set an appropriate balance between the discretion and flexibility that
a court needs and the constraints that must be present for a court to
enjoy the legitimacy of sound arguments and decisions.
VI
IS UNIFORMITY POSSIBLE OR DESIRABLE?
Nearly all of the commentary on preliminary injunctions has
stated that one uniform standard should be developed. 7 ° The rea-
sons are self-evident: ease of application, fairness, and simplicity.
Indeed, uniformity is assumed to be a virtue to the extent that it is
seldom discussed, even though preliminary injunctions can theoreti-
cally be entered in almost any type of case. Therefore, the first
question that arises is whether it is desirable to have a single stan-
dard that will apply to all cases? Second, how can we implement a
uniform standard that will be consistently applied over time?
A. Is Uniformity Desirable?
To the chorus of voices singing the anthem of uniformity, there is
one descant: R. Grant Hammond. Like other commentators, Pro-
fessor Hammond begins by noting the demise of the traditional
standard and the development of a multitude of non-harmonious
standards in both the United States and the Commonwealth coun-
tries.'71 He credits this demise to the rise in the volume of cases,
170 See, e.g., Black, supra note 6; Castles, supra note 6; Leubsdorf, supra note 8; Wolf,
supra note 6.
171 Hammond, supra note 11, at 240-71.
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the recognition of new legal interests, and the development of new
forms of litigation beyond the traditional bipolar model described
by Lon Fuller.' 72 He also implies that this breakdown has occurred
as a result of the waning attractiveness of formalism, with its stress
on universal formulas.17 3 Although he argues that we need a new
standard,174 he does not believe that the answer lies in a universal
model.17 Rather, his model states that after we determine the
existence of a real dispute, we should then inquire into its nature.
We should then ask "what threshold test is appropriate for that
kind of dispute?" '76
Hammond's model requires the development of a preliminary in-
junction standard for each category of lawsuit, for example, labor,
environment, or commercial. He suggests this because the differ-
ences between causes of action make a uniform standard do too
much. A uniform standard, for Hammond, becomes a subjective
balancing exercise.177 Additionally, because his model is tied to
causes of action, he asserts that it is more "capable of accommodat-
ing diverse and changing kinds of interests."'7 8 Upon closer read-
ing, however, it seems that his main objection to a uniform
balancing test is that it permits too many result-oriented decisions.
For example, he twice asserts that the balancing test in unreview-
able,17 9 implying that the balancing test excuses the lower court
from giving reasons for its decision, or that even if reasons are
given, an appellate court cannot meaningfully review these reasons.
This follows from his initial concern that a new model is needed
that will "yield better articulated and more closely reasoned
decisions. '"180
Once Hammond's criticisms of a uniform balancing model are
coupled with his goal of better reasoned decisions, I believe that my
view and his can be reconciled. Both seek the same goal: better
1721d. at 243-44, 248, 251, and 259-60.
173 Id. at 243-44, 248. These references trace the rise of the traditional formula in the
nineteenth century as consistent with formalism. The rest of the article suggests the
demise by implication.
174 Id. at 272-82.
175 1d. at 278-82.
176 Id. at 278.
177 Id. at 281. In his text, he gives the example of a defamation suit and the ground-
ing of a DC-10 aircraft. While these have some features in common, an assertion that a
universal formula will work for both leads to an "impotent legal relativism," i.e., a
balancing test. Id. at 278.
178 d. at 281.
179 Id. at 278, 281.
180 d. at 241.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
reasoned decisions in which the court must explain its reasoning
without hiding behind conclusory invocations of balancing tests or
irreparable harm. If a uniform test is used as a way to avoid con-
fronting the real issues in a case, it will do more harm than good.
The point, however, of the standard advanced in this Article is that
by refining the definitions of components of the preliminary injunc-
tion standard, the court's discretion is bounded. Further, the stan-
dard encourages deliberation of real issues in a case, particularly the
description of irreparable harms. With a uniform balancing test
thus constrained, the objections that Hammond raises can be fully
met, and the advantages of a uniform standard outweigh the criti-
cisms that he advances.
B. Is Uniformity Possible?
Assuming uniformity is desirable, by what process could a stan-
dard be developed that will be consistent over time? Sitting en
banc, the Eighth Circuit provided an answer in the antitrust case of
Dataphase Systems v. C.L. Systems."' Before the decision, two
standards were used within the circuit. For many years, the Eighth
Circuit had used a traditional four factor test typified by Minnesota
Bearing v. White Motor."8 2 Several years later, in Fennell v. But-
ler,18 3 the court adopted an alternatives test as a result of dissatis-
faction with the traditional test."84 But the existence of two tests
within the circuit caused confusion among the district courts. After
noting that the two tests are not contradictory, the court concluded
that "[tihe major difficulty with application of the traditional test
[arose] from the phrase 'probability of success on the merits.' ,185
181 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981).
182 470 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973). The standard used in Minnesota Bearing was de-
scribed in Dataphase as "(1) whether there is a substantial probability movant will suc-
ceed at trial; (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable injury absent the
injunction; (3) the harm to other interested parties if the relief is granted; and (4) the
effect on the public interest." Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 112.
183 570 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1978).
184 In Fennell, the two alternatives test was defined as "a clear showing of either (1)
probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of
hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting preliminary relief." Id. at 264
(citations omitted).
185 Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. The court stated that whatever the formulation, the
factors considered by the two tests were the same: (1) threat of irreparable harm to the
movant, (2) the balance of harms between the movant and other parties to the litigation,
(3) the probability of success on the merits, and (4) the public interest. Id. This non-
contradictory characterization of the two tests is disputed by Judge Ross in his concur-
rence. Id. at 115.
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Many lower courts read this phrase to require litigants to prove that
they had a "greater than fifty per cent likelihood" of prevailing."8 6
Even in cases where the litigant had demonstrated a strong case on
the other three factors, the district courts were denying relief. An
alternatives test allowed courts to escape this result. But it meant
courts could manipulate outcomes by choosing between two coex-
isting standards. The court rejected allowing the merits this much
weight. Rather, every case requires a court to consider the plain-
tiff's likelihood of success on the merits in context with the relative
injuries to the parties and the public. Thus, the Eighth Circuit ar-
rived at a balancing test. Under this approach, the court noted that
ordinarily the district court will not be required to scrutinize the
merits of the case. Instead, this will occur only when the other eq-
uities are closely balanced. This new approach retains much of the
liberality of alternatives approach while clarifying the weight for
each factor.1 8 7
The significance of this case rests not in the result, but in the
process by which it was reached-through an en banc decision.
Short of a sorely needed Supreme Court decision, this will be the
only way in which the circuits can begin to impose a uniform stan-
dard. It is remarkable how relatively simple this process can be.
Until now, much of the confusion has come from different panels
within a particular circuit adopting differing standards. This can
lead to internal dissension within a circuit. m8" What Dataphase sug-
gests is that upon finding an appropriate case, each circuit ought to
convene en banc to adopt a prevailing and uniform standard for
issuing preliminary injunctions. While this may not end differences
between circuits, it will at least end differences within them.
Finally, the advantages of this process will be lost unless the cir-
cuit judges consistently apply the same standard to their review of
district court decisions. Appellate review, like defining the compo-
nents of the standard, is another way to constrain the discretion of
the district courts. It continues the dialogue between the parties
and the court that is begun at the trial level and can lead to refine-
186 Id. at 113. Many courts construed this to require a mathematical probability of
success, but the court rejected this interpretation. Thus, it appears likely that the
Eighth Circuit will not be affected by Judge Posner's formula.
187 Id.
188 Sometimes these disagreements break out beyond the boundaries of dissents. See,
e.g., Mulligan, supra note 134. In this article, Judge Mulligan roundly criticizes the
Second Circuit's adoption of the two alternatives test in Sonesta Int'l Hotels v. Welling-
ton Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
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ment of any standard in the light of real world experience. In this
case, preliminary reports indicate that the Eighth Circuit adoption
of a uniform standard has been successful. 1
89
CONCLUSION
The standard proposed in this Article resonates with the more
traditional statements of the standard for a preliminary injunc-
tion.' 90 For example, it applies across the board to all types of
cases. Similarly, it retains most of the categories by which the stan-
dard has been described historically: purpose, success on the mer-
189 See Black, supra note 6, at 32; McLaughlin & Tallon, supra note 6, at 899. But see
Wolf, supra note 6, at 218-20. Despite the Database pronouncement, he states that three
patterns of cases have emerged since that decision.
190 Use of the traditional components, or of one of the accepted relationships, is not a
foregone conclusion. Both Hammond, supra note 11, and Wolf, supra note 6, have
developed entirely new standards for the preliminary injunction. Hammond states his
as follows:
The contemporary rationale for the remedy can be simply expressed as a vehi-
cle for the preservation of litigation for effective later determination. Given
that conceptual purpose for the remedy a variable threshold model could be
adopted as a more logical development of existing models. This would require
a judge to ask three preliminary questions: 1. is there a real dispute (in the
sense of the claim being nonfrivolous)? 2. what is the nature of that dispute?
3. assuming that question I is answered affirmatively and after the analysis
required in question 2 is undertaken, what threshold test is appropriate for
that kind of dispute?
Assuming that the necessary identification of a threshold test has been made
and met, the court should then consider, as now, the balance of convenience
(including any public interest elements) and the adequacy of any other ave-
nues of relief (not merely damages).
Hammond, supra note 11, at 278, 280. The advantages of this model are that it avoids
universality of the balancing model, it provides a rationale for remedy, and it accommo-
dates "diverse and changing kinds of interests." Id. at 281.
Wolf's model is similar in that it takes the court through a number of steps:
The district judge should: (1) determine whether the non-moving party in-
tends or is likely to take action which will injure the moving party; (2) if so,
determine whether that injury is of such a nature that the court cannot pro-
vide an adequate remedy after a trial on the merits of the case; (3) if irremedia-
ble injury is likely, determine whether the issuance of interim relief will cause
the non-moving party more than negligible harm; (4) if so, consider whether
protective devices (e.g., bonds or other terms and conditions) are available
which, if imposed on either or both parties, will reduce to a negligible level the
anticipated harm without the need for preliminary relief; and (5) if not, issue
the injunction, requiring the moving party to post a bond to take other steps to
protect the non-moving party while the injunction is in force. Finally, if the
case is ready for final disposition at the time of the request for interlocutory
relief, the court should consolidate the preliminary hearing with the trial on
the merits and dispose of the entire case in one step.
Wolf, supra note 6, at 235-36.
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its, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and public interest.
Finally, it consciously retains the balancing test, some version of
which is used in most circuit courts. The similarities, however, end
there.
The impetus for this standard is both historical and progressive.
It looks backward as it recaptures the historical purpose of the pre-
liminary injunction, that of preventing or minimizing harm which
will occur before a full trial on the merits. But the bulk of this
Article modernizes the standard, focusing on the way in which its
components have become loaded with historical detritus. The ma-
jor task was housecleaning: each component was analyzed to see
what current meanings it had. What remains is a cleaner standard
that can contribute to the resolution of cases and uphold the legiti-
macy of the courts.
Under the proposed standard, the underlying purpose of the pre-
liminary injunction is to create a state of affairs that will enable the
court to best give effective relief to the parties when the case has
been fully heard on the merits. While not technically a component
of this standard, the purpose regulates its employment and can
serve as a tie-breaker when differing remedies or orders are pro-
posed by the parties. It also acts as a consideration which will help
the court conserve and marshal its resources in the most effective
way possible.
Of the four components of the standard, the argument concen-
trated on two components: success on the merits and irreparable
injury. Success on the merits is de-emphasized because of the way it
encourages procedural misuse of this remedy. However, the mov-
ing party must at least raise a serious question on the merits. The
question may be novel, but it must be made in good faith and be
nonfrivolous. Where plaintiff can conclusively demonstrate abso-
lute success on the merits, the court should consolidate the prelimi-
nary injunction motion with a request for final relief pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).
On the other hand, the role of irreparable injury has been in-
creased. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that before the conclusion of a
trial on the merits, they will be injured in a way which cannot be
redressed by any legal or equitable remedy at the conclusion of the
trial. Failure to do so should result in the denial of the motion. The
new content of the term, supplied by Professor Rendleman's analy-
sis, makes the standard consonant with the functional ways in
which the courts conduct legal analysis.
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The balance of harms remains much the same in this proposal as
it does traditionally. This component allows the defendant to intro-
duce evidence of the harms that will accrue to its interest if the
preliminary injunction is improvidently entered. Similarly, either
party may present evidence of how the grant or denial of the prelim-
inary injunction would affect the public interest, as defined by inter-
est groups or society generally.
Finally, the relationship between the factors envisions a balancing
test which can occur at two points. First, after the presentation of
plaintiff's case, the court balances plaintiff's showing on the merits
and irreparable injury. The plaintiff must, at a threshold, show at
least a serious question on the merits and show some irreparable
injury. After the plaintiff has met this threshold, the court shall
consider defendant's evidence of irreparable harm. At this stage,
the court should also consider what effect a bond or a carefully
drafted order would have on minimizing irreparable injuries to
either party.
This proposal comports with the qualities of a good standard. It
encourages purposeful discussion between the parties and the courts
while it promotes semantic equality by requiring the use of clearly
defined components. By remaining within the tradition of equitable
yet bounded discretion, it remains as easy to use as is possible. At
the outside, it will eliminate the easy cases where the moving party
has failed to show any injury and raise any serious question on the
merits. The hard cases, of course, will remain those which call on
the court to exercise its discretion. This standard will not hide the
difficulty of making a good decision in these cases, but it will give
courts and litigants modernized tools with which to candidly dis-
cuss issues and make more legitimate decisions.
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